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This paper presents DIALOG (Digital Investigation Ontology); a framework for the manage-
ment, reuse, and analysis of Digital Investigation knowledge. DIALOG provides a general,
application independent vocabulary that can be used to describe an investigation at different
levels of detail. DIALOG is defined to encapsulate all concepts of the digital forensics field and
the relationships between them. In particular, we concentrate on the Windows Registry,
where registry keys are modeled in terms of both their structure and function. Registry
analysis software tools are modeled in a similar manner and we illustrate how the inter-
pretation of their results can be done using the reasoning capabilities of ontology.
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1. Introduction
The rate of computer crime continues to increase year to year.
The sophistication of the crimes and the variety of techno-
logical devices employed in these offenses are becoming
critical challenges to the investigators (Sophos, 2009; U.S.
Department of Justice, 2007). As well as the inherently
distributed cyber crimes, such as DOS attacks, low-level cyber
crimes involving only a few individuals now typically involve
the investigation of multiple devices. Consequently digital
investigations are more prolonged, complicated and require
the integration of many disparate sources of data.
As a result investigators require extensive training in
a wide range of software tools, techniques, hardware equip-
ment and digital devices. In addition to being aware of
emerging technologies and possible sources of evidence,
investigators need also be aware of inaccuracies and appli-
cability of using a particular technique or tool on a particular
device for a particular case.
Guides are continually being published to advise the
investigators on how to investigate a particular device and
carry out the investigation effectively (Carvey, 2005; Farmer
and Burlington, 2007; Sophos, 2009; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2007; Wong, 2009). The transfer of knowledge to
relevant parties is informal and periodic. A central, applica-
tion and case independent knowledge base that can be
continually supplemented with new knowledge can be an
invaluable resource of reference to an investigative team.
The knowledge base, designed in a logic manner, would
reflect the digital forensic field and give structure to an
investigation by defining each of the main major concepts
and their attributes.
Ontologies have been developed for the Semantic Web to
give a structure to the seemingly unstructured world of the
Internet. They are a ‘‘formal, explicit specification of shared
conceptualisation’’ (Gruber, 1995) providing a vocabulary to
model various domains. They have diversified to model such
domains as biomedicine (The Open Biomedical Ontologies,
2009) and everyday common sense knowledge (Cycorp Inc.,
2009). Full ontology languages, restrictions and rules have
been developed to work only on this meta information and
allow models to infer new knowledge.
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In this paper we present the Digital Investigation Ontology,
DIALOG, an ontology for the representation, reuse and anal-
ysis of Digital Investigation knowledge. DIALOG contains the
main concepts of digital forensics and their relationships and
captures the universe of discourse of the Digital Investigation
domain. It is designed to be independent of any specific
investigation and can grow by progressively expanding its
domain knowledge with definitions of new entities in
a similar way to other ontologies.
DIALOG is envisioned to play a number of roles in the
Digital Investigation field:
1) As a knowledge repository: DIALOG can be instantiated with
specific pieces of information that can be searched for by
investigators if they encounter it in a case and do not know
what it is.
2) As a case manager: Evidence relating to a specific case can be
annotated in DIALOG and provide a central place where
information can be shared between relevant parties,
therefore facilitating collaboration.
3) As an evidence unification mechanism: Similar to the above,
evidence from different devices can be annotated and rules
can be employed to resolve logic inconsistencies that may
arise.
4) As an investigation guide: As well as definitions and con-
ceptualisation, DIALOG can include warnings, metrics and
other abstract concepts to guide the investigator away from
making mistakes.
We will limit the scope of this paper to the encoding of
forensics knowledge associated with the Windows Registry.
The Registry is a central database storing a vast amount of
information about the system resources (software and hard-
ware), its users and their preferences. Guides, similar to those
of the file system, have been published to analyse the registry
(Registry Hives, 2008). The scope of the evidence heldwithin it,
its importance in the investigation and the wide variety of
tools available for its analysis make it analogous to the file
system. Expansion of DIALOG to represent information with
respect to the file system can therefore be achieved in the
same way as for the registry. Modeling other specific areas of
interest can also be incrementally added to the ontology.
In particular, we will use the registry to illustrate DIALOG’s
role as a knowledge repository and casemanager (points 1 and
2 above). It is unlikely that investigators would be familiar
with all registry keys and the purposes. We will illustrate how
DIALOG can model the registry key and serve as a reference
for unfamiliar keys. As a case manager, DIALOG can annotate
evidence from existing investigation tools to add meaning to
the results. We enhance the registry analysis software,
RPCompare (Kahved!zic´ and Kechadi, 2008). Using DIALOG,
RPCompare can annotate its results and use formal rules to
interpret them and automatically classify the evidence into
categories. The rules can be checked and verified for consis-
tency using existing ontology logic reasoning.
Section 2 describes DIALOG. The ontology is an expressive
entity and can elaborate and refine the definitions of the
digital investigation concepts by relating them to each other
across branches of a taxonomic tree. DIALOG consists of four
main sub-ontologies discussed in detail in Section 2.
In Section 3, we discuss the use of various sub-ontologies and
concepts to model the knowledge associated with the
Windows Registry. RPCompare is modeled with respect to
both its structure and its operations in Section 4. The advan-
tage of using an application independentmodel tomanage the
results of RPCompare is discussed. In particular, we illustrate
the ability of DIALOG to annotate the results with evidence
concepts and infer new knowledge. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. DIALOG framework
An ontology is an abstract description of concepts and their
relationships in a given universe of discourse. It creates
a formal, application independent vocabulary that can be
reused across different fields. Currently, the ontology models
the digital forensics field through four main dimensions.
! Crime Case: Types of investigations based on the crime
suspected to have been committed.
! Evidence Location: Types of locations or sources of evidence
that can be searched to find evidence.
! Information: Types of information (files, software) that can be
found in the system.
! Forensic Resource: Types of resources (tools, software) that
can be employed to carry out an investigation.
The Crime Case, Evidence Location and Information ontologies
are orthogonal to each other and define distinct concepts and
entities of the domain. The Forensic Resource ontology, on the
other hand, can be viewed as a specialisation of the Information
ontology. It defines tools and other concepts used specifically
in the forensic field and is in fact mirrored in the relevant
place in the Information ontology.
Fig. 1 shows the hierarchy of the top level concepts of the
sub-ontologies. The knowledge base is constructed by
creating instances of the concepts with their relevant rela-
tions and restrictions. The figure omitsmore specific concepts
and only shows the is_a relations between them. More
detailed description of the sub-ontologies including their
relations are shown in subsequent sections.
2.1. Crime case ontology
Every case starts by setting an aim, namely to prove or
disprove if one or more crimes have occurred, and no inves-
tigation can be carried out if no crime is suspected to have
happened. The Crime Case ontology is the main ontology for
description of cases and catagorises different investigation
types in terms of the suspected crime. Since the Crime Case
and Crime concepts are analogous, Crime taxonomies
(JISC Legal, 2007; Shinder, 2002; U.S. Department of Justice,
2008) are used as starting points in developing the Crime Case
ontology. An investigation may fall into one or more Crime
Case category if one or more suspected crimes are present.
There are a variety of ways that crimes and investigations
can be organised by an ontology. Computers can be used as
a target or tool to commit high tech versions of crimes that
have evolved out of the traditional non digital realm, such as
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the Fraud and Extortion, or simply contain supporting evidence
of inherently non digital crimes such as Murder. The ontology
defines the NonCyberCrimeCase and the CyberCrimeCase as the
two most general and disparate concepts to differentiate
investigations between these two types of crimes.
The NonCyberCrimeCase concept conceptualises those
investigations of crimes that can never be conducted in the
digital world, such as Murder, and which happen to have
evidence in a digital form. The ontology does not provide an
exhaustive characterisation of them. A small number of
concepts, such as the HomicideCase, DomesticViolenceCase, and
KidnapCase concepts are defined since they have been
discussed in other digital investigation guides (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 2008). The CyberCrimeCase, on the other hand,
defines those investigations of crimes that have a definitive
digital component. In CyberCrimesCase, the evidence found on
the computer, either the data stored in it or the user actions
carried out with it constitute a crime.
Three top level concepts are defined in the ontology to
differentiate between all types of investigations. The Theft-
Case, ViolentCrimeCase and SexualCrimeCase concepts are used
as container classes to generalise the wide variety of cases.
The number of these has been kept to a minimum and
expresses the domain more accurately. The CyberTheftCase
(theft in a digital environment) for example, is defined as both
TheftCase (crimes that involve unlawful appropriation) and
CyberCrimeCase. Similarly, CyberFraudCase is both FraudCase
(theft by deception) andCyberCrimeCase.
DigitalMaterialCrimeCase conceptualises all investigations of
crimes that are perpetrated if a person possesses or propagates
content that has been deemed illegal. These Prop-
agationOfUnlawfulMaterialCase and PossessionOfUnlawfulMaterial-
Case concepts differ from TheftCase in that these materials are
not assumed to be stolen. The concepts are disjoint since it may
be lawful for a person to possess something but unlawful for
them to distribute it, such as copyrightedmaterial. On the other
hand, it is illegal to posses child pornography even if the suspect
does not distribute it.
All other crimes fall into one or more of the following cate-
gories: CyberTheftCase, CyberFraudCase, DisruptiveCyberCrimeCase,
CyberHarassmentCase, CyberTrespassCase. The first two concepts
are the application of traditional Theft and Fraud crimes to the
digital domain and contain some important case concepts such
as the IdentityTheftCase, FinancialFraudCase, PhishingCase concepts
amongst others. Financial fraud is defined as those activities
that require the victim to part with money in good faith for non
existent good or services. Phishing occurs when a victim
unwittingly parts with sensitive information that can be used
later against the victim. The theft of the information is used to
‘steal’ a person’s identity andwithdraw theirmoney or bill them
formaterial that the attacker receives. As a result, PhishingCase is
a specialisation of IdentityTheftCase and is marked as such in the
ontology.
The latter three top CrimeCase concepts cover the Dis-
ruptiveCrimeCase, the CyberHarassmentCase and the CyberTres-
passCase concepts. The DisruptiveCrimeCase defines
investigations of crimes involving behaviours that disrupt
regular business and includes the potentially non-legal Mis-
useOfSystemsCase concept. CyberHarassmentCase covers inves-
tigations of harassing or abusive behaviours, such as
CyberBullying or SexualHarassment. The CyberTrespassCase
concept defines cases of UnauthorisedEntry and Hacking.
CrackingCase is defined as both a HackingCase and Dis-
pruptiveCrimeCase concept.
2.2. Information ontology
A typical computer system holds a wide variety of content.
In an investigation, a small subset of relevant information
that proves or disproves a criminal hypothesis is searched for.
Typically the same type of information is retrieved depending
on the case type. As such, an Information ontology, classifying
different types of data, provides another dimension for
describing digital forensic cases.
At the top level of the Information hierarchy, the sub-
ontology defines the DataObject, the ServiceObject and the
SoftwareObject concepts as the main types of information that
can be found on the system. DataObject defines all tangible
units of data in the system. The DataFragmentObject, encom-
passing such concepts as the RegistryKeyObject and the Pass-
wordObject, is a DataObject and is the smallest logical unit of
evidence viewed independently of any files that it may belong
Fig. 1 – Top Level of the Ontology.
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to. The FileObject is viewed as a collection of Data-
FragmentObjects rather than a single entity. Object properties
hasFileName and hasFileExtension amongst others are used to
identify FileObject individuals. Further categorisation of Fil-
eObject to the MediaFileObject, TextualFileObject etc., is accom-
plished by specialising the restrictions to specific extensions
and particular metadata that defines these file types.
The SoftwareObject concept identifies software and appli-
cations that are found on the system. Full description of
software in terms of artifacts, actions and language as in
(Lando et al., 2007) is beyond the scope of the system. At the
moment, we treat SoftwareObject as a static entity stored in the
file system which can be executed to accomplish some func-
tion. As such, the ontology specialises the concepts based on
the function of the software and models the software’s on-
disc structure by relating with relevant DataObjects, files and
folders, belonging to that SoftwareObject.
The two highest specialisations of SoftwareObject are Per-
sonalApplicationSoftware Object and SystemSoftwareObject. The
former encapsulates all software that the user installs while
the latter conceptualises the OperatingSystemObject concept.
UtilitySoftwareObject is PersonalApplicationSoftwareObject and
defines all the small tools that manage, tune and organise the
data for the benefit of the user, such as anti-virus software.
These small tools usually carry out a small number of tasks to
indirectly benefit the user. In contrast, ApplicationSoftwar-
eObject is a PersonalApplicationSoftwareObject installed by the
user to directly create, edit or view data or execute major
tasks. The majority of personal software is covered by this
concept and includes WordProcessingSoftwareObject, IMSoft-
wareObject amongst others.
The ServiceObject concept is not a SoftwareObject nor a Data-
Object but a service provided by remote providers, such as a web
site or a remote storage provider, to the user. Examples of these
services are the InternetForumSite, the SocialNetworkingService
amongst others. Each may leave specific evidence on the host
system but is not installed into the system itself.
The Information ontology also contains a container
concept, EvidenceObject, which relates to the forensic field
specifically. It contains collective concepts relevant to
forensics such as the UserActivityEvidence concept, the Sys-
temConfigurationEvidence concept, the UserProfile concept
amongst others. The concepts combine ServiceObject, Data-
Object and SoftwareObject and help identify evidence relating
to a particular aspect of the investigation. For example, the
CommunicationEvidence concept relates to the evidence of
communications between the owner of the digital device and
any other third party. The concept references DataObjects,
(EmailFileObject), SoftwareObjects (FileSharingSoftware), and
ServiceObjects (Forums) through appropriate object relations.
Other evidence concepts, such as the UserActivityEvidence
and the GamingActivityEvidence are defined in a similar
manner. As well as describing evidence, these concepts also
allow DIALOG to annotate evidence in a single case and
behave as a case manager.
2.3. Information location ontology
Potential evidence may reside in a variety of locations. Any
of the data described in the Information ontology in Section
2.2 can be stored in any number of different locations in the
file system. The location of many important files however,
such as system and application log files tend to be easily
predicted. Other less structured data, such as user files, can
benefit from the generality that an ontology brings and
guide the investigator to the most probable location. The
InformationLocation ontology captures this element of the
investigation.
The top concepts of the InformationLocation are the Digital-
Location and the ConventionalLocation concept. The latter
defines those locations that have relevant evidence for the
investigation but are not of the digital type. These include
ReferenceMaterial such as the ComputerManual and the Fil-
ePrintouts concepts. These concepts are analogous to the
NonCyberCrimeCase concept in Section 2.1. Both relate more to
the traditional non cyber crime element of the investigation,
but are relevant and are included in the respective ontologies
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2008).
The DigitalLocation concept defines all locations that store
the information in a digital format. It differentiates between
the PhysicalLocation, those locations that have a physical
dimensions, and the LogicalLocation, those locations of data
irrespective of the physical medium it is stored on. The
former concept encompasses physical objects that store
information, i.e. the DigitalDevice, and those units of phys-
ical space that make it possible for the information to be
stored, the LowLevelLocation concept. The LowLevelLocation
concept is a physical location of data that is hidden from the
user but that is relevant to the forensic examiner, such as
SlackSpace, SwapSpace and FreeSpace, collectively termed
AmbientDataLocations.
The DigitalDevice, conversely, is a macro location that can
store relevant digital data and is defined as an appliance used
in conjunction with computers or as a computer replacement.
The SmallScaleDigitalDevice and LargeScaleDigitalDevice
concepts encompass the two main different types of these
devices. The former can be defined as any portable device
designed to carry out a limited number of digital tasks and
include the ThumbDrive, the Printer, the MobilePhone etc. The
definition is broader than those found in (Harrill and Mislan,
2007) but differentiates from the second group of devices. The
LargeScaleDigitalDevice is a device of one or more inter-
connected computers designed to do or facilitate a multitude
of digital tasks. These include the Grid, the Server and the
PersonalComputer itself.
Every DigitalDevice references its data in a logical way to
hide the physical manner that the data is stored. The logical
addressing of the data is conceptualised in the Logical Location
concept. Two types of logical address are specified, the
RemoteResource Location and the LocalResourceLocation. The
former concept defines those locations outside of the local
DigitalDevice such as IPAddress andWebpageAddress. The latter,
LocalResourceLocation, concept is the opposite. It conceptual-
ises the location of local resources and defines the OnDi-
scLocation and the FileSystemLocation concept, such as the
FilePath, FATEntry andMFTEntry etc. To facilitate addressing of
specific elements within files themselves, the IntraFileLocation
concept is also defined. The paths of specific registry keys, the
location of embedded data structures, metadata amongst
others are defined as being IntraFileLocations.
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2.4. Forensic Resource ontology
The forensic program is the basic apparatus of the cyber crime
investigation. It is used to extract, analyse, preserve and
present all form of digital evidence. They provide a resource to
the investigators to achieve their aims and therefore are an
important dimension in describing the investigation itself.
The ForensicResource ontology defines these resources and
relates them to the relevant data locations and data that they
operate on. It identifies two types of resource, the Foren-
sicSoftwareObject and the ForensicServiceObject.
The ForensicServiceObject concept is a ForensicResource that
provides assistance to investigators through the dissemina-
tion of valuable information. Typically coming in the form of
a ReferenceService, these forensic resources include the Hash-
DatabaseService, the ReportingServiceObject etc. DIALOG itself
can be considered an instance of the ForensicServiceObject
concept. Semantically, as well as a ForensicResource, the For-
ensicServiceObject is also a ServiceObject previously defined in
the Information sub-ontology and is related to that ontology in
the appropriate manner.
The ForensicSoftwareObject is similarly related to the Soft-
wareObject of the Information sub-ontology. However it is also
a ForensicResource which conceptualises those software tools
that can be used to carry out an investigation. The concepts
follow closely the definition of main investigation stages iden-
tified in many forensic guides. Namely, the PreparationSoftwar-
eObject, theDetectionSoftwareObject, theAcquisition SoftwareObject,
the EvidencePreservationSoftwareObject, the AnalysisSoftwareObject
and the ReportingSoftwareObject concept.
The PreparationSoftwareObject concepts defines software that
are used prior to any crime ever happening. They are used to
assess risk, educate personnel and train investigators for any
crime that may warrant investigation in the future and include
the SurveySoftwareObject and the CrimeMappingSoftwareObject.
The Detection SoftwareObject concept, on the other hand, defines
those tools that can be used to alert relevant parties of a crime
occurring at that instant. They are used as a preventative
measure or against a person who is suspected of committing
a criminal activity. Amongst others, the concepts cover the
NetworkSnifferObject and the KeyLoggerObject.
The aforementioned tools are designed to be applied pro-
actively to stop crime from happening, the remaining cate-
gories cover those investigative tools designed to be used in
the traditional reactive sense when a crime has already been
suspected to have occurred. They cover the ‘Acquisition’
phase, ImagingSoftwareObject for example, the evidence ‘Pres-
ervation’ phase, the HashingSoftwareObject concept for
example, the analysis phase and the reporting phase of the
investigation.
The ‘Analysis’ phase defines the majority of tool types.
Four sub-types of analysis software have been identified and
are defined by the BrowserSoftwareObject, the Con-
versionSoftwareObject, the FilteringSoftwareObject and the Data-
Correlation SoftwareObject concepts. The BrowserSoftwareObject
defines those softwares that merely present data to be
inspected, such as the HexViewer. The Conversion Softwar-
eObject concepts defines those softwares that convert data
from one format to another. The conversion is typically from
a less understandable state of data to another more
understandable one. The process is reversible and verifiable.
The DecryptionSoftwareObject concept as well as the traditional
FileFormat ConversionSoftwareObject concept belong to this
category.
TheFilteringSoftwareObjectconceptsdefines thosesoftwares
that take a large amount of data as input and return a smaller
subset of data that has passed a certain condition specified by
the user. They encompass the KeywordSearchSoftwareObject as
well as the more complicated PatternRecognitionSoftwareObject
concept. Typically, every investigation will involve some
form of searching and many software will be applicable to
this category. The final AnalysisSoftwareObject concept is the
DataCorrelation SoftwareObject concept. This concept defines
softwares that takea smallnumberof disparatedata and relate
them to each other to highlight relevant evidence. TimeStamp
CorrelationSoftwareObject, FileComparerSoftwareObject and other
crime scene reconstruction software are examples of these
types of tools.
2.5. Other ontologies
Other smaller ontologies are also utilised to define other
relevant concepts of cases. In particular a smallActorOntology
is used to define the various parties involved in an investiga-
tion. This simple ontology only defines the ComputerisedActor,
the HumanActor and the HumanOrganisation. The sub-ontology
will be further enhanced by the inclusion of established Actor
ontologies such as the Friend Of A Friend (FOAF) ontology
(Brickley and Miller, 2007).
3. Modeling the registry
The concepts of DIALOG in Section 2 constitute a general
description of the main parts of the investigation. The
ontology will be refined down towards specialised subjects to
define them in more detail. As an illustration, we will model
the knowledge associated in the Windows Registry. The
registry, asmentioned before, is analogous to a file systemand
contains a huge variety of information and is analysed in the
majority of cases. The structure of the registrywill bemodeled
with respect to both the structure and the type of evidence
that the specific registry keys hold. Modeling of the entire file
system can be conducted in a similar way.
3.1. Modeling the registry structure
The registry is a hierarchical database constructed of two
main elements, the key and the value. Each key can
contain one or more subkeys and is analogous to the folder
in the file system. The values hold the actual data and are
analogous to files. Both the value and the key are named
but only the key is time stamped and contains a Last
Modified Time field.
The registry combines keys stored in a number of different
hive files to a single central database. Each key is referenced
with a unique path using this single database perspective. The
path makes no distinction where in the file system the key is
stored which in reality could be in one of five main hive files.
The same key with the identical name and function may exist
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in different places of the registry and have only a very subtle
difference in their meaning. Tables 1 and 2 shows an example
of a key used to store the path of documents that were
accessed most recently.
Any system that attempts to define the registry key accu-
rately must take into account these structural properties first.
Logically they can be represented as axioms or rules that
constrict the keys definitions. The rules are summarised
below.
1) Key has Key min 0.
2) Key has Value min 0.
3) Key has LastAccessedDate exactly 1.
4) Key has RegistryPath min 0.
5) Key isIn RegistryHive min 0.
Any structure that fulfils the axioms above can be infer-
red to be a registry key. From an information point of view,
the registry key is a small fragment of data that holds a very
specific type of content. It is an instance of a DataObject and
falls under the DataFragment concept in the Information sub-
ontology. It is also a DataContainerObject thatmay hold one or
more different registry values. Both are encapsulated in the
RegistryKeyObject and RegistryValueObject concepts and are
related to each other with Object relations. The DIALOG
ontology also provides File and Data Location concepts to
define the RegistryHiveObject and the RegistryPath compo-
nents of a key. They too are related to the RegistryKeyObject
concept with similar Object relations. The Name and
LastAccessedDate attributes, conversely, are represented by
Datatype properties as they do not have a conceptualisation
in the ontology.
Fig. 2 illustrates themodeling of the structure of a key with
DIALOG. All instances contain these properties upon creation.
Cardinality and ‘Necessary and Sufficient’ conditions exist to
enforce the instantiation of certain essential attributes. All
keys, for example, must contain a name for the key to be
created.
3.2. Modeling the registry semantics
Each key of the registry serves a purpose in the Operating
System. Since the number of keys is so vast the functions vary
greatly and have different implications in the forensic inves-
tigation. Semantic modeling deals with modeling the inter-
pretations of what the keys are designed to do rather than
how they are constructed.
To model the functions of the key, the Information sub-
ontology contains concepts specific to digital forensics
evidence. The EvidenceObject componentmentioned in Section
2.2 describes the functions of the information irrespective of
what type of information that evidence is. The concepts,
including CommunicationEvidence, MultiMediaEvidence, System-
ConfigurationEvidence and others, provide a vocabulary to tag
individual registry keys and other information fragmentswith
evidence concepts related to their function.
There are two major concepts of evidence defined; the
PassiveEvidenceObject and the TemporalEvidenceObject concept.
The former encapsulates all evidence objects that provide
evidence of an event occurring at a single point in time. The
latter, conversely, provides evidence of activity ranging across
a time range. The activity typically has to be inferred from one
or more passive evidence objects but can range from a very
short time period, such as a single user session to a longer
period such as the lifetime of the computer. The user activity
is vitally important to investigators and typically requires
a large amount of reasoning. Further sub concepts are defined
for both of these types of evidence.
The definition of a registry key can be enhanced by defining
it to be both a RegistryKeyObject and any number of Evi-
denceObject concepts. At present, this tagging must be carried
out manually when an instance of a registry key is created.
However, an automated tagging system based on more accu-
rate definitions and axioms can be developed to carry this out
automatically.
As an example, we will illustrate the enrichment of the
definition of the ‘RecentDocs’ MRU key used in Section 3.1.
This MRU (Most Recently Used) key holds an ordered list of the
last documents accessed by the user. The file system path of
any document opened or edited by the user is entered in this
key. As such it provides an important clue to user activity and
is usually analysed in a forensic investigation. Here, we
extend its definition to reflect this function.
The primary role of this key is to display a small list of
names of the most recently opened documents in the My
Recent Documents area of the Start menu. It is a point of
convenience designed to improve the experience of the user.
From a forensic point of view, the key reveals a number of
different types of evidence. Firstly, the key entries are file
name entries. They testify that the files with those names exist
or have existed in the file system at some stage in the recent
past. The key, also contains an ordering to that list, specifying
the order at which these files were accessed by the user. As
such they reveal a limited user history with respect to those
Table 1 – Summary of the structure of the ‘RecentDocs’ key.
Details of the ‘RecentDocs’ registry key
Property Type Number Example
Name String 1 RecentDocs
LastModifiedDate Date and Time 1 02/03/2009 14:16:38 UTC
Subkey Registry Key >0 avi, .dat, .doc, .exe, .flv, .rar, .txt, .zip
Values Registry Value >0 MRUListEx
Logical Path Registry Path >1 HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs
Storage Location Hive File >1 SOFTWARE
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files. The former role is encompassed by the Doc-
umentEvidenceObject concept while the latter is encompassed
by the DocumentAccessedObject. This key therefore is an
example of both a TemporalEvidenceObject and a PassiveEvi-
denceObject. Table 1 summarises the roles of the key and the
concepts in the EvidenceObject ontology that define those roles.
Other forensic keys can be annotatedwith similar evidence
concepts relevant to their function. Not all keys are instances
of TemporalEvidenceObject. Most keys are passive objects
showing evidence for only one point in time. Keys, much like
files, have a single timestamp updated every time the key is
modified. However, they can still be annotated with the
concepts from the PassiveEvidenceObject part of the ontology.
HKLM\Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader\7.0 for example, simply
testifies that the software Acrobat Reader exists on the file
system and as well as being an instance of the Regis-
tryKeyObject is also a SoftwareEvidenceObject.
The combination of the TemporalEvidenceObject and Passi-
veEvidenceObject instances form a knowledge base of registry
keys which can be accessed by applications that require
interpretation of the roles of the keys.
4. Applications of DIALOG: RPCompare
There are a number of programs employed in the forensic field
to extract evidence useful to the investigation. By using
DIALOG, software can adopt a more automated approach and
present the results in an application independent
environment. The results can therefore become a part of
a larger investigative process using multiple software prod-
ucts to accomplish different tasks. It can serve as a single
unifying structure in cataloging all sorts of evidence from
a variety of different tools where outputs of one software are
inputs of another.
In this section we use DIALOG to add semantics to the
results from the registry analysis program RPCompare
(Kahved!zic´ and Kechadi, 2008). RPCompare takes in as input
the series of Restore Points present in a typical Windows
system and compares the registry hives stored within them.
Since the Restore Points are snapshots in time of the state of
the system, the differences between them can highlight the
activity that has occurred from one point to another. In order
to do this, the DIALOG ontology is to conceptualise each of the
software’s concepts; its structure, inputs and outputs and will
provide a set of inference rules that will mimic the reasoning
process of human users. Although human interaction will not
be totally removed, the ontology can be used to make the
process simpler and the results more understandable.
4.1. RPCompare structure
RPCompare compares each key from the first hive with
a corresponding key in the second hive. The hives are chro-
nologically orderedwith a period of time elapsing between the
creation of one restore point and another. If a key exists in the
first hive and does not exist in the second, then that key has
been Removed during this period. Similarly, if a key is found in
Table 2 – Summary of the function of the ‘RecentDocs’ key.
Functional detail of registry keys
Key Function Concept
RecentDocs - Functions as a registry key RegistryKeyObject
- State that these entries (files) exist or have existed DocumentEvidence
- Information on the order that these entries were accessed in DocumentActivity
Fig. 2 – Conceptualisation of a Registry Key.
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the second hive and not in the first then that key has been
Added in the interim. If the same key exists in both but has
different content, then that key has beenModified. RPCompare
can compare a single key, a set of keys, or the complete set of
registry hives.
Therefore, the main function is to correlate similar data
(the registry keys) located at different points in the files
system (the Restore Point folders). As such RPCompare is an
instance of the a DataCorrelationSoftwareObject concept in the
ForensicResource sub-ontology. Specifically a ComparerSoftwar-
eObject concept. It takes as input at least two similar data
containers (keys, hives or Restore Points) and returns
containers storing either removed, deleted or modified
registry keys. These containers are instances of the RPCom-
pareContainerObject concept and are a specialisation of the
VolatileContainerObject concept. These concepts are summar-
ised below. Other attributes such as software Author, Owner,
Execution environment etc are omitted.
RPCompare isAnInstanceOf ComparerSoftwareObject
RPCompare takesAsInput
RegistryKeyObject atleast 2 or
RegistryHiveObject atleast 2 or
RestorePointObject atleast 2
RPCompare returnsOutput RPCGroupObject
RPCGroupObject contains RPCUnitObject
RPCUnit contains RegistryKeyObject and
RPCUnit hasModifiedState{‘‘Modified’’,‘‘Removed’’,
‘‘Added’’}
Comparisons result in a large number of differences. To
make the process more efficient, the authors of RPCompare
described a set of improvements to guide the investigator
intelligently (Kahved!zic´ and Kechadi, 2008). First by using
RPCompare on progressively smaller number of keys and then
applying a series of simple rules to classify the resulting
differences. The general methodology is user intensive and
does not have any transparency and formality in the classifi-
cation rules. The rules are not checked for consistency, are not
used to automatically infer new knowledge and are very
application specific. Here we attempt to formalise the rules by
mimicking the human investigator reasoning process.
Consider Fig. 3, it shows a very small sample of differences
between three user registry hives. We identify two sets of
manual reasonings techniques.Thefirstoccurs if theuserknows
the function of the key. For example, installed software usually
places its registry keys using the HKCU\Software\Manufacturer\
Product convention. Since the HKCU\Software\Adobe\Acrobat
Reader\7.0 key was added in the first set of results it can be
inferred that the software Acrobat Reader Version 7 was
installed. Secondly, changes in unknown keys, such as HKCU\
Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader\7.0\AVGeneral\cRecentFiles\c1 can
be attributed to the same Adobe product because it is found
under the same registry branch. Even if the role of the key is not
known, it can at least be inferred that it was likely to been added
by Acrobat Reader. The aim of DIALOG is to mimic this simple
reasoning process.
Therefore, inferring meaning out of RPCompare results is
achieved in two steps:
1) Identify Key: Extract the function of the removed/added/
modified key.
a) Find the system component that owns this key.
b) Find the component’s function.
2) Infer Meaning: Interpret the difference of the component
across time.
4.2. Identification of RPCompare results
The first step is achieved by querying the ontology knowledge
base for the particular key. If it exists then the role of the key
can be directly accessed. For example, the key HKLM\Soft-
ware\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run is a well known
key storing the paths of the software that is executed when
the system starts up. As well as a RegistryKeyObject, this key is
also an instance of SoftwareEvidenceObject and System-
StartUpEvidenceObject. It has been identified as an important
forensic key and has been inserted in the ontology knowledge
base manually. The latter two concepts can therefore be
directly accessed by RPComparer and presented in the results
to add semantics to the key.
However, similar to the way the user cannot remember all
functions of all keys, it is impractical to annotate all possible
keys with the evidence objects. Some grouping must be
applied. To this end, we introduce two types of RPContainer-
Object concept each of which stores particular aspects of the
results. The RPCUnitObject instances store changes with
respect to a single comparisonwhile RPCGroupObject instances
stores one or more similar units grouped under a common
Fig. 3 – Results in RPCompare.
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key. Each group contains one common parent key the func-
tion of which is known. Reasoning on the entire group as
a whole can be achieved by reasoning on this one group key.
A limited set of grouping keys have been defined. Initially
RPCompare will create groups based only on the HKCU\-
Software\Manufacturer\Product convention. This will encompass
any software changes since this is the convention most soft-
ware follows. Other grouping keys such as HKCU\Softwar-
e\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam, storing positional and access
information for folders, HKCU\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersio-
n\Explorer\FileExts storing file extension settings of Explorer etc.
will be defined incrementally. Fig. 4 illustrates one group of
keys from the results in Fig. 3. The keys in this case contain
two units grouped under HKCU\Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader
key which has been defined in DIALOG as both a Regis-
tryKeyObject and a SoftwareEvidenceObject concept.
Growth of the registry key knowledge base for identifica-
tion can therefore be an incremental process with progressive
definition of grouping keys.
4.3. Inference of RPCompare results
Once a key has been found to be removed/added or modified
by RPCompare and its function specified in the abovemanner,
DIALOG can be further utilised to reason about the activity of
the key over a period of time. As mentioned before, the
DIALOG evidence sub-ontology contains temporal evidence
concepts to annotate the results returned by RPCompare. A
number of specific categories of activity that RPCompare
reveals most readily are summarised below. More specialised
activity can be progressively defined in a similar way to the
other concepts in DIALOG.
! Software Installation/Uninstallation: Any activity whereby
a software program has been installed or removed from the
file system.
! Software Configuration: Any activity which results in
a change of configuration of a software, including the
Operating System itself.
! User File Activity: Any evidence of activity relating to files.
Reveals evidence of file access and creation.
! User Folder Activity: Any evidence of activity relating to
folders. Usually this reveals evidence of folders only, not
creation.
The inference of new knowledge and the reasoning about
the individuals is accomplished using the Semantic Web Rule
Language, SWRL (W3C, 2004). SWRL has been designed to
provide rule functionality to ontologies and continues to
receive a great amount of development. SWRL rules consist of
an antecedent condition and a consequent. The consequent
only being executed if the antecedent evaluates to true. It
takes as arguments any concept or relation in the ontology
and are used with the RPCompare concepts to infer new
relations and knowledge.
For example, the following simple rule asserts that if
a RPCGroupObject instance holds a common key, as
described in the previous section, then the system
component whose changes they encapsulate is the same
as the software that owns the common key. In the case of
the group in Fig. 3, this rule would imply that the group is
evidence of Adobe-Acrobat software since the grouping
key, \Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader, has been asserted to
belong to that software.
<antecedent>
di:RPUnit(?di:x) and
di:hasCommonKey(?di:x, ?di:y) and
di:belongsToSoftware(?di:y, ?di:soft)
<consequent>
di:isEvidenceOfSoftware(?di:x, ?di:soft)
More complicated rules can be built incrementally. The
following rule states that if a RPCUnitObject instance has
a comparison state ‘‘Added’’ and contains a registry key that is a
child of that group’s common key and that common key has
a path of HKCU\Software then that RPCUnitObject is evidence of
that software’s installation. In the case of Fig. 3, RPCUnit1would
correctly be classified as a SoftwareInstallationActivityObject since
it contains \Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader\7.0 a direct subkey
of the common key \Software\Adobe\Acrobat Reader. Further
knowledge, with respect to the installation can be added after
Fig. 4 – Conceptualisation of the Results using RPGroupObject and RPUnitObject containers.
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this inference, suchaswhat softwarewas installed,whenand to
which user the software can be attributed to.
<antecedent>
di:RPGroupObject(?di:obj) and
di:isEvidenceOfSoftware(?di:obj, ?di:software)
and
di:containsUnit(?di:obj, ?di:x) and
di:RPUnitObject(?di:x) and
di:hasComparisonState(?di:x, ‘‘Added’’) and
di:contains(?di:x, ?di:k) and
di:RegistryKeyObject(?di:k) and
di:hasParentKey(?di:k, ?di:p) and
di:RegistryKeyPath(HKCU-Software) and
di:hasRegistryPath(?di:p, HKCU-Software)
<consequent>
di:SoftwareInstallationActivityObject(?di:x)
and
di:hasSoftwareInstalled(?di:x, ?di:software)
These rules illustrate how the rules can be applied to the
ontology to extract and infer new knowledge based on exist-
ing knowledge in the ontology. They demonstrate two types of
knowledge that can be inferred. Further rules are being
defined for the RPCompare software to fully embody the
reasoning employed in the results. Once executed these rules
will generalise the results to the evidence concepts provided
by DIALOG. Therefore, once a new forensic cases is started, it
can pin point the exact type of evidence required for its
completion. Although RPCompare generally extracts only user
activity, further softwares can also be empowered to use the
ontology and provide a single and unified concepts base for all
types of evidence. A validation methodology will also be
developed to assert that these rules are accurate.
5. Discussion and future work
This paper presented a model to encapsulate the knowledge
associated with digital investigation cases. It provides
a vocabulary of concepts and associations in the form of an
ontology to annotate as much as possible the semantics of
those cases. Four main general sub-ontologies have been
defined to model four areas of these cases. These include
ontologies of the cyber crime type, the types of data locations,
the type of data itself and the tools used to find that data. We
believe that these four branches encompass the majority of
cyber crime concepts, however the ontology can be enhanced
with other concepts if they are deemed to be relevant.
DIALOG, like all other ontologies, is application independent
it canbeused for a variety of purposes.Oneof themainpurposes
of such a model is to define various properties and attributes of
important forensic concepts to make their meaning under-
standable by the investigators. In particular we have demon-
strated this by modeling the semantics of the knowledge
associated with the Windows Registry. We have modeled the
registry key both structurally and semantically to reflect their
role in the database. The concepts provided by DIALOG were
specialised where appropriate and were used to tag the
instances of registry keys with the types of evidence they hold.
As an illustration, we enhanced the registry program
RPCompare (Kahved!zic´ and Kechadi, 2008) to use the
ontology. In a similar way to the registry key, we con-
ceptualised the program by encoding both its structural
aspects and its results. Sample SWRL rules were presented to
show how those rules can mimic the reasoning that the
human applies when analysing RPCompare results.
DIALOG can also be used as a collaborative tool that unifies
the evidence found in a case. It can be used in a distributed
environment where different investigators can annotate
evidence to the relevant concepts in DIALOG. Different
evidences from different tools can also be included in this way
and ontology rules can be employed to highlight any potential
inconsistencies that may arise. Future work will include
expanding the concepts definition in the ontology and
encoding more rules to detect these errors. DIALOG was used
to annotate evidence from a single source (the registry) using
a single tool (RPCompare), future development will allow
integration of similar evidences from multiple sources, such
as mobile phones and files systems. To that end, relevant
existing ontologies that define Actors (Brickley and Miller,
2007) and temporal concepts (W3C, 2006), for example, will be
reviewed and incorporated in DIALOG in the near future.
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